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DEVISING A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO THE REVERSE 
PAYMENT DILEMMA: HOW CONGRESS CAN BALANCE 
COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND THE PUBLIC POLICY 
FAVORING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES WITHOUT 
LITIGATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Central to any effective healthcare legislation is controlling the nation’s 
rising healthcare costs.1  In 2009, national health expenditures expanded by 
5.7%, outpacing GDP growth and representing the single largest one-year 
increase in history.2  Much of the bloated healthcare costs are attributable to 
the price-growth of prescription drugs.3  In 2008, American consumers, along 
with federal, state, and local governments, spent more than $234 billion on 
prescription medications, an increase of 3.2% over the previous year.4  By 
2019, the growth of prescription drug spending is expected to reach 7.7%, with 
increases in drug prices expected to account for approximately half of that 
growth.5 
Despite sustained increases in prescription drug prices, generic versions of 
brand-name drugs have brought enormous benefits to consumers and 
governments by delivering medications at up to 80% below branded prices.6  
The modern generic drug industry grew out of the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.7  
 
 1. See Laura Meckler, Obama’s Health Expert Gets Political, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2009, 
at A1 (highlighting concerns expressed in Congress that the proposed healthcare reform package 
will not do enough to keep healthcare costs from “spin[ning] out of control”). 
 2. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE 
PROJECTIONS 2009–2019 *1 (2008) [hereinafter CMS REPORT], available at http://www.cms. 
gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2009.pdf. 
 3. Id. at *2–3. 
 4. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 
AGGREGATE AMOUNTS AND AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE, BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE: 
SELECTED CALENDAR YEARS 1960–2008, available at http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealth 
ExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf. 
 5. CMS REPORT, supra note 2, at *3. 
 6. Anticompetitive Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Benefits of a 
Legislative Solution: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 123 (2007) 
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of the FTC). 
 7. Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History, 
Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 588 (2003).  See also Drug Price Competition & 
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To promote generic competition, the Hatch-Waxman Act allows generic drug 
companies to challenge brand-name drug patents before their date of 
expiration, which helps ensure that invalid drug patents do not delay the 
introduction of generic competition into the market.8  In the 1990s alone, 
consumers saved nearly $10 billion in the wake of successful patent challenges 
by drug manufacturers looking to market generic versions of just four 
blockbuster drugs: Prozac, Zantac, Taxol, and Plantinol.9 
Settlement agreements between brand-name drug manufacturers and 
generic firms have limited the type of generic competition the Hatch-Waxman 
Act was designed to encourage.  In the typical scenario, the brand-name 
manufacturer pays a would-be generic competitor a certain sum in exchange 
for the generic’s agreement to drop its patent challenge and delay entering the 
market.10 Although the law encourages good-faith settlement of patent 
litigation, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has expressed significant 
concern that these settlement agreements allow patent-holders to purchase 
more reduced competition than patent rights can provide, thereby “disrupt[ing] 
the careful balance between patent protections and encouraging generic entry 
that Congress sought to achieve in the Hatch-Waxman Act.”11 
For more than a decade, the FTC has battled these settlements in federal 
courts, and in 2007, it began pushing for a legislative solution.12  Recently, 
with fresh support from the Obama administration13 and the Department of 
 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 
(codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 8. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION:  AN 
FTC STUDY 4–5 (2002) [hereinafter FTC 2002 STUDY] (interpreting Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.)). 
 9. Hearings, supra note 6, at 18. 
 10. Id. at 1. 
 11. Id. at 4. 
 12. See generally id. (pushing for a legislative solution).  The FTC suffered its most recent 
defeat in the case of In re AndroGel Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 
2010).  There, the FTC and purchasers sued the manufacturers and suppliers of a testosterone 
replacement gel, AndroGel, alleging that the defendants entered into a reverse payment 
settlement, which thereby eliminated the potential for competition in the AndroGel market before 
2015 in violation of the antitrust laws.  AndroGel, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1376.  The district court 
determined that the proper framework for determining the legality of reverse payment settlements 
requires an examination of: “(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the 
extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.”  
Id. at 1377 (quoting Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005)).  In 
applying this analysis, the district court held that the FTC failed to allege that the settlement 
agreements exceeded the scope of the brand-name patent.  Id. at 1377. 
 13. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY:  RENEWING 
AMERICA’S PROMISE 28 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/fy2010_ 
new_era/A_New_Era_of_Responsibility2.pdf (stating the new administration’s intention of 
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Justice,14 Congress’ efforts in devising a solution to the reverse payment 
dilemma have intensified.15  In early 2009, Senators Chuck Grassley and Herb 
Kohl introduced the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, which was 
subsequently approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee.16  The proposed 
legislation makes presumptively unlawful any settlement resolving a patent 
infringement claim in which a generic challenger receives “anything of value” 
in exchange for its agreement not to “research, develop[], manufactur[e], 
market[], or s[ell]” its product for “any period of time.”17  Then, it provides 
that this presumption can be overcome if the settling parties demonstrate that 
the “precompetitive benefits of the agreement outweigh the anticompetitive 
effects.”18  In order to guide this analysis, the bill establishes an open-ended 
list of “competitive factors” to be considered by the fact finder.19 
This Note analyzes the Grassley-Kohl response to the reverse payment 
dilemma.  Part I illustrates the role of patent and antitrust law in the 
pharmaceutical industry, details the statutory provisions of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, and examines the origin and evolution of reverse payment settlements.  
Part II outlines the key provisions of the Grassley-Kohl bill, concluding that, 
while a rebuttable presumption of illegality is the most appropriate legislative 
solution, the proposed legislation leaves important questions unanswered, 
namely, the proper scope of competitive factors to be weighed in determining 
whether the presumption of illegality has been overcome.  Part III suggests that 
the competitive effects analysis under the proposed legislation should be 
broadened to the extent necessary to protect and promote the threefold interest 
in competition, innovation, and good-faith settlement of litigation. 
 
barring “collusion between brand name and generic drug manufacturers intended to keep generic 
drugs off the market”). 
 14. See Brief for United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation at 10, In re 
Cirprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro IV), 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 
05-2851), 2009 WL 2429249 [hereinafter DOJ Brief] (advocating for a rule that would deem 
reverse payment settlements presumptively illegal). 
 15. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Center for American 
Progress, “Pay-for-Delay” Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress Can Stop 
Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers’ Wallets, and Help Pay for Health Care Reform 
(The $35 Billion Solution) (June 23, 2009) (“[A]s Congress moves forward on health care reform, 
momentum to prohibit these agreements appears to be growing . . . .”). 
 16. S. 369, 111th Cong. § 1 (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Oct. 15, 2009); see 
Press Release, Senate Comm. on Fin., Senate Committee Approves Grassley, Kohl Bill to Give 
Consumers Access to Lower-Priced Medicine (Oct. 15, 2009), available at http://finance.senate. 
gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?id=fe363d3c-5478-4a54-9b39-811393985340. 
 17. S. 369, § 3. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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I.  OVERVIEW OF PATENT & ANTITRUST LAW, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT, AND 
REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 
Consumers rely on brand-name drug manufacturers to develop new 
medications.20  At the same time, consumers rely on competition from generic 
firms to increase access to affordable medications once developed.21  
Consequently, competition in the pharmaceutical industry invites the inevitable 
intersection of patent and antitrust policy.22  While the antitrust laws benefit 
consumers by prohibiting practices that unreasonably restrict competition 
between drug manufacturers,23 the “legal monopoly” provided by the Patent 
Act benefits consumers by providing brand-name drug manufacturers, or 
“pioneers,” with the incentives to develop innovative medications.24  The 
Hatch-Waxman Act encourages patent litigation as the “primary vehicle” 
through which the competing demands of patent and antitrust policy are to be 
reconciled.25  The following section will examine the intersection of patent and 
antitrust law, the Hatch-Waxman Act, and reverse payment settlements. 
A. The Intersection of Antitrust and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry 
Justice Thurgood Marshall declared that the “[a]ntitrust laws in general, 
and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.”26  
Economically, the antitrust laws are designed to prevent the acquisition of 
market power, the exercise of which allows an individual firm to restrict 
competition in order to raise prices above competitive levels to the detriment 
of consumers.27  Section One of the Sherman Act declares “every contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade” to be illegal.28  Federal 
 
 20. JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33717, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT 
LITIGATION SETTLEMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION AND INNOVATION 22 (2008). 
 21. Id. at 22–23. 
 22. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The patent 
and antitrust laws are complementary, the patent system serving to encourage invention and the 
bringing of new products to market by adjusting investment-based risk, and the antitrust laws 
serving to foster industrial competition.”). 
 23. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 12. 
 24. See Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The reason for the patent 
system is to encourage innovation and its fruits: new jobs and new industries, new consumer 
goods and trade benefits.”); United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 670 F.2d 1122, 1127 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (“The patent laws, authorized by the Constitution, were enacted by Congress to 
stimulate invention and reward innovation . . . .”). 
 25. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 23. 
 26. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
 27. ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN 
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 17 (Am. Casebook 
Ser., 2d ed. 2008). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
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courts have subsequently interpreted this provision as condemning 
“unreasonable” restraints of trade.29 
In order to determine whether a challenged practice violates § 1 of the 
Sherman Act, courts usually employ a “rule-of-reason” analysis, which takes 
into account the relevant history of the restraint, the facts relevant to the 
business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the 
restraint’s nature and effect.30  This complex inquiry into challenged conduct 
involves substantial costs, in both time and judicial resources, which courts 
have alleviated through recognition of a per se rule of illegality.31  The per se 
rule is applied to categories of conduct “which because of their pernicious 
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively 
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry” 
into anticompetitive effects or procompetitive justifications.32  Still, courts are 
careful not to depart from the rule-of-reason framework, since the per se rule 
does not permit any inquiry into procompetitive justifications.33  Accordingly, 
“[i]t is only after considerable experience with certain business relationships 
that courts classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act.”34 
The Patent Act confers upon the inventor, or “patentee,” the right to 
exclude others for a limited term from making, using, offering for sale, or 
selling the patented invention.35  Although the right to exclude competition 
tends to result in higher prices and lower production than if competition were 
unrestrained, an expected legal monopoly increases long-term consumer 
welfare by providing pharmaceutical companies with the principal incentives 
to innovate.36  In effect, it allows firms to recoup their front-end costs of 
 
 29. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 342–43 (1982). 
 30. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 
344 (“Once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with 
confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption that 
the restraint is unreasonable.”). 
 31. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 343. 
 32. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).  The categories of conduct 
deemed per se violations of the Sherman Act include price-fixing, market division, and group 
boycotts.  Id. 
 33. M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 977 (1st Cir. 1984). 
 34. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972). 
 35. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006), invalidated by Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health & 
Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91 (RV/EMT), 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011); see also 
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965) (quoting 
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) (holding that 
patent laws are “an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right of access to a 
free and open market”)). 
 36. See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
761, 766–67 (2002) (pointing out that without patents, companies that invested in research and 
development at great risk may see their profits go to an after-market competitor). 
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discovery and development by preventing others from appropriating the value 
derived from that investment.37 
In order to enforce the right to exclude others from making, using, or 
selling the patented invention, the Patent Act grants the patentee the right to 
file an infringement action, at the attendant risk of its patent later being judged 
invalid or not infringed.38  The filing of the infringement suit normally does 
not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws, even though it may have 
additional anticompetitive effects.39  Antitrust liability does arise where a 
patentee brings in bad faith an infringement action (1) to enforce a patent it 
knows to be invalid, or (2) against a party it knows is not infringing its 
patent.40  Nonetheless, with the Patent Act’s provision permitting the filing of 
an infringement action, the Department of Justice observed that: “Congress 
thus struck a balance . . . between (1) encouraging innovation by providing for 
the enforcement of legitimate patent rights, and (2) protecting consumers’ 
interest in a competitive marketplace by providing for the invalidation of 
undeserved patents.”41  Likewise, in the pharmaceutical industry, the Hatch-
Waxman Act encourages patent litigation between brand-name drug 
manufacturers and generic firms as the principal mechanism through which the 
competing interests in competition and innovation are to be reconciled.42 
B. Striking a Balance between Competition & Innovation: The Hatch-
Waxman Prescription 
In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act, more commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.43  Prior to 
its enactment, manufacturers seeking to market generic drugs had to undergo 
an FDA approval process comparable to that required of pioneer 
manufacturers, which involved highly expensive and time-consuming human 
clinical testing and safety studies.44  These studies were required even if they 
duplicated those previously conducted on the brand-name drug.45  Moreover, 
generic manufacturers could not begin the approval process until the pioneer’s 
patent expired, because beginning earlier would constitute an act of 
 
 37. Id. at 767. 
 38. 35 U.S.C. § 281.  The possible defenses against a charge of patent infringement include: 
1) noninfringement, 2) unenforceability, and 3) invalidity.  Id. § 282(1). 
 39. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 40. 2 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 38:03 (West 
2004) (1983). 
 41. DOJ Brief, supra note 14, at 13. 
 42. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 9–10. 
 43. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 44. FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 8, at 3–4. 
 45. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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infringement.46  Thus, the timing and process of FDA approval effectively 
extended the life of the pioneer’s patent.47  The purpose of the Act, therefore, 
was to promote increased generic competition while still preserving the 
incentives for pioneer manufacturers to develop new medicines.48 
To encourage generic competition, the Hatch-Waxman Act relaxed the 
clinical testing procedures required of generic drug manufacturers seeking 
FDA approval.49  Pharmaceutical medications, both pioneer and generic, must 
be approved as safe and effective prior to marketing.50  In order for a pioneer 
drug manufacturer to demonstrate that its product is safe and effective, it must 
conduct human clinical trials and submit the results in a New Drug Application 
(NDA).51  For the generic drug manufacturer, however, the Hatch-Waxman 
Act establishes an expedited procedure.52  The generic firm does not need to 
conduct human clinical trials, provided that the active ingredient in the generic 
product is the bioequivalent of the brand-name drug.53  Instead, it “must 
conduct tests that show the generic drug is the same as the pioneer drug and 
that it will be properly manufactured and labeled.”54  Then, it may submit those 
results in an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).55 
When the generic firm files the ANDA, it must make one of four 
certifications: (I) the pioneer manufacturer did not file a patent; (II) the 
pioneer’s patent has expired; (III) the generic drug will not be marketed until 
expiration of the pioneer’s patent; or (IV) the pioneer’s patent “is invalid or 
will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which 
the application is submitted.”56  If an ANDA filer makes a Paragraph IV 
certification, it must notify the patentee that it is seeking FDA approval to 
 
 46. FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 8, at 4. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 7, at 590. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Todd A. Rathe, Comment, Medical Device Experimental Use Exception in Patent 
Infringement: Ely Lilly v. Medtronic, 16 J. CORP. L. 625, 646 (1991). 
 51. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 7, at 587. 
 52. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006), invalidated by Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept of Health & 
Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91 (RV/EMT), 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011); see 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED 
PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY xii (1998) [hereinafter CBO STUDY] 
(noting that the Hatch-Waxman Act “reduced the average delay between patent expiration and 
generic entry from more than three years to less than three months . . . . [and] increased the 
proportion of brand-name drugs that face generic competition once their patents expire”). 
 53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). 
 54. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv)–(v); H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2649. 
 55. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 16. 
 56. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
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market the generic drug.57  Upon receipt of the notice, the patent-holder retains 
the right to sue the ANDA filer for patent infringement, because a Paragraph 
IV certification is considered a constructive act of infringement.58  Then, if an 
infringement claim is asserted within forty-five days of receiving the ANDA 
filer’s notice, the patent-holder is entitled to a thirty-month stay of FDA 
approval of the ANDA.59 
The purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s provision governing Paragraph 
IV certifications is to ensure that weak patents on brand-name medications do 
not escape invalidation and its fruits, generic competition and lower drug 
prices.60  To encourage generic firms to make Paragraph IV certifications 
challenging the validity of a brand-name patent (or proving the non-
infringement of the generic version), the Hatch-Waxman Act rewards the first 
Paragraph IV ANDA filer with 180 days of marketing exclusivity, during 
which the FDA cannot approve other ANDAs for the same drug.61  Thus, the 
“first-filer” enjoys a six-month market duopoly with the brand-name drug 
manufacturer, often worth millions of dollars.62  However, this “statutory 
bounty” is forfeited if the first ANDA filer fails to market the generic product 
by the later of the date that is (1) seventy-five days after the approval of its 
application is made effective or thirty months after it was submitted, whichever 
is earlier; or (2) seventy-five days after the date on which a court enters 
judgment that the NDA filer’s patent is invalid or not infringed, a court signs a 
settlement agreement that includes a finding that the patent is invalid or not 
infringed, or the patent information is withdrawn by the NDA filer.63 
 
 57. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i). 
 58. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 59. Id.  The FDA will withhold approval of the ANDA until the earliest of three alternative 
events: 1) the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the date of receipt of the ANDA 
filer’s notice; 2) the date on which a court enters judgment that the patent is either invalid or not 
infringed; or 3) expiration of the patent term, if a court finds that the patent is valid and infringed.  
Id. 
 60. See FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 8, at 7 (noting that the 180-day provision gives generic 
drug manufacturers who file under Paragraph IV a motive to either litigate or design around weak 
patents). 
 61. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); see Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 7, at 603. 
 62. Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and Sustainability: How to Achieve the 
Dual Objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act While Resolving Antitrust Issues in Pharmaceutical 
Patent Settlement Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 450 (2008). 
 63. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i).  Alternatively, the statutory bounty is forfeited if the first 
ANDA filer: 1) withdraws the application; 2) withdraws or amends the Paragraph IV 
certification; 3) fails to obtain tentative approval of the application within thirty months after the 
date on which it was filed; or 4) enters into an agreement with another applicant, the FTC or the 
Attorney General files a complaint, and a finding is made by the FTC or a court that the 
agreement has violated the antitrust laws.  Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(II)–(V). 
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Together with the numerous provisions designed to increase generic 
competition, the drafters of the Hatch-Waxman Act took measures to preserve 
the market incentives for innovation.  First, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides 
that the patent term is “extended by the time equal to the [FDA] regulatory 
review period for the approved product.”64  This allows the patentee to regain 
patent life lost as a result of the lengthy FDA-mandated testing and approval 
procedure.65  It is intended to “create a new incentive for increased 
expenditures for research and development of certain products which are 
subject to premarket government approval.”66 
In conjunction with patent term restoration, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
provides extended market exclusivity for new chemical entities (NCE) and 
new clinical investigations.67  If the drug contains an NCE, the NDA holder is 
entitled to an additional five years of market exclusivity.68  The effect of this 
provision is to prevent the submission of another patent application relying on 
the NDA’s safety and efficacy data.69  If the NDA contains “reports of new 
clinical investigations (other than bioavailability studies) essential to the 
approval of the application and conducted or sponsored by the applicant,” then 
the NDA holder is entitled to three additional years of market exclusivity.70  
The effect of this provision is to prevent for three years the final approval of an 
ANDA “for the conditions of approval of such drug.”71 
In sum, the Hatch-Waxman Act has been largely successful in balancing 
the dual interests in innovation and competition in the pharmaceutical 
industry.72  That success, however, has not come without its problems.  An 
unintended consequence of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to create strong 
incentives for brand-name drug manufacturers and Paragraph IV ANDA filers 
 
 64. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2006).  There are five eligibility requirements for patent term 
restoration: 1) the patent term has not yet expired; 2) the patent term has never been previously 
extended; 3) the application for extension is properly submitted; 4) the drug has been subject to a 
regulatory review period before its commercial marketing or use; and 5) the permission for the 
commercial marketing or use is the first permitted marketing or use of the drug.  Id. § 156(a). 
 65. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 7, at 590–91. 
 66. H. R. REP. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648. 
 67. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 7, at 592–93. 
 68. Id. at 592.  The statute provides five-year exclusivity to any new “active ingredient.”  21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(ii).  The FDA has interpreted this provision as applying only to new “active 
moieties.”  Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 7, at 592.  Thus, an NCE for purposes of the five-
year exclusivity provision means “a drug that contains no active moiety that has been approved 
by FDA in any other application.”  Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a)). 
 69. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 7, at 592. 
 70. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(iii), 355(j)(5)(F)(iii). 
 71. Id. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(iii), 355(j)(5)(F)(iii). 
 72. See CBO STUDY, supra note 52, at xiii (concluding that the decline in revenues of 
pioneer drug companies resulting from increased generic competition has not made drug 
development, on average, unprofitable). 
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to enter potentially anticompetitive settlement arrangements using payments 
flowing in “reverse,” from the patent holder, or the plaintiff, to the alleged 
infringer, or the defendant.73  These reverse payment settlements can delay the 
marketing of generic versions of blockbuster medications, potentially costing 
American consumers billions of dollars each year.74 
C. A Side Effect of the Hatch-Waxman Act: Reverse Payment Settlements 
Litigation between a brand-name firm and Paragraph IV ANDA filer can 
end with either a finding of infringement, obstructing generic competition, or a 
finding of invalidity or non-infringement, allowing generic entry.75  Like other 
forms of patent litigation,76 however, the litigants may decide to settle rather 
than proceed to trial.77  Paragraph IV settlements challenged as violations of 
the antitrust laws entail: 1) some form of payment by the pioneer to the generic 
firm; and 2) an agreement by the generic firm to delay marketing its product 
for some period of time.78  Although the Patent Act grants pioneers holding a 
valid patent the right to exclude infringing competition, the possibility that a 
pioneer, lacking confidence in the strength of its patent, is intentionally 
evading a judgment of invalidity or non-infringement, thereby purchasing 
more reduced competition than the patent can provide, raises competitive 
concerns and forms the basis of possible antitrust liability.79  The following 
section explores both the origins and evolution of reverse payment settlements. 
 
 73. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro II), 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 
251 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[I]n creating an artificial act of infringement (the ANDA IV filing), the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments grant generic manufacturers standing to mount a validity challenge 
without incurring the cost of entry . . . .  This statutory scheme affects the parties’ relative risk 
assessments and explains the flow of settlement funds and their magnitude.”) (citations omitted). 
 74. See FTC STAFF STUDY, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2 (2010) [hereinafter FTC 2010 STUDY] (estimating that reverse payment 
settlements cost consumers $3.5 billion per year). 
 75. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 1. 
 76. Defendants-Appellees in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation stated 
the following: 
In traditional patent litigation, the accused infringer is making, using, or selling the 
claimed invention and at risk of paying infringement damages.  Such cases usually settle 
with the parties compromising on damages.  The accused infringer usually pays to settle 
to reduce its risk of paying damages.  But consideration also flows from the patent owner 
to the accused infringer because the innovator settles for less than its maximum provable 
damages.  Thus, both parties compromise, discounting the claimed damages based on 
their risk assessments. 
Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 26, In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation 
(Cipro IV), 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2008-1097), 2008 WL 2446896. 
 77. See THOMAS, supra note 20, at 1. 
 78. Id. 
 79. DOJ Brief, supra note 14, at 22. 
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1. The “Natural Byproduct” of the Paragraph IV Certification Process 
Generally, courts and legal scholars agree that reverse payment settlements 
arise out of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s unique statutory framework.80  The 
Hatch-Waxman Act encourages pioneers to file an otherwise weak patent 
infringement claim against a Paragraph IV ANDA filer because the claim 
triggers the automatic thirty-month stay of FDA approval.81  Even if the 
pioneer asserts a weak infringement claim, the ANDA filer may still find it 
more advantageous to settle, rather than go to trial, because the total producer 
profits in a monopoly exceed the total producer profits in a duopoly, with the 
result that the pioneer’s possible loss at trial greatly exceeds the ANDA filer’s 
possible gain.82  Both parties will be better off, therefore, if the ANDA filer 
ceases its attempt to market the patented product and accepts a payment that is: 
1) less than the pioneer’s possible loss at trial; and 2) more than the ANDA 
filer’s possible gain at trial.83  In this scenario, the patent-holder is effectively 
paying the generic firm to stay out of the market, even though it may have a 
legal right to enter.84 
Even where a pioneer has a high probability of success at trial, it has an 
incentive to settle the litigation.85  Professor Thomas Cotter stresses that an 
agreement by the ANDA filer not to enter the market guarantees monopoly 
profits for a risk-averse pioneer in the near-term.86  Moreover, the generic 
challenger suffers no loss and avoids the possibility of having to pay damages 
for patent infringement.87  Finally, for the pioneer, Professor Hemphill points 
out that reaching settlement with the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer de-
incentivizes subsequent ANDA filers from challenging the patent, given that 
 
 80. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro II), 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 252 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[S]o-called reverse payments are a natural by-product of the Hatch-Waxman 
process.”); Thomas F. Cotter, Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements Involving Reverse 
Payments: Defending a Rebuttable Presumption of Illegality in Light of Some Recent 
Scholarship, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1069, 1076 (2004) (“The Hatch-Waxman Act . . . contains 
several provisions the unintended consequence of which is to provide a greater incentive than 
would otherwise exist for the parties to some patent suits to agree to settlements involving reverse 
payments.”). 
 81. Cotter, supra note 80, at 1079–80. 
 82. Id. at 1080. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Schering-Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Due to the 
asymmetries of risk and large profits at stake, even a patentee confident in the validity of its 
patent might pay a potential infringer a substantial sum in settlement.”) (quoting Valley Drug Co. 
v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1310 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
 86. See Cotter, supra note 80, at 1079. 
 87. Id. 
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the later-filing generic firms become ineligible for the highly lucrative 180-day 
exclusivity period.88 
2. The Evolution of Reverse Payment Settlements 
Professor Hemphill traces the evolution in reverse payment settlements 
since 1984 by collecting and synthesizing publicly available information 
regarding the frequency and terms of settlement.89  His study finds that early 
reverse payment settlements involved simple cash payments by brand-name 
firms to generic challengers.90  In exchange for the payment, the generic firm 
agreed to delay marketing its product for the entire remainder of the patent 
term.91  From 1993 to 1997, Hatch-Waxman settlements for five different 
drugs included a cash payment in exchange for delayed generic entry.92 
In 1997, brand-name firms began engaging in side deals with generic 
challengers, rather than making outright cash payments in exchange for 
delayed entry.93  Professor Hemphill shows that this evolution was likely a 
response to increased antitrust enforcement and a 1998 judgment, which 
concluded that a first-filing generic firm could retain its right to the 180-day 
exclusivity period even if it settled the litigation.94  Subsequent to that 
decision, brand-name firms could offer a first-filing ANDA challenger 
payment in the form of “retained exclusivity,” that is, guaranteed access to the 
statutory bounty as a substitute for an outright cash payment.95  Generic firms, 
therefore, became more willing to settle the litigation and agree to a later entry 
date, rather than proceed to trial and risk losing the right to duopoly profits.96  
In Hatch-Waxman settlements involving several blockbuster drugs, such as 
Provigil, Effexor XR, and Plavix, payment took the form of retained 
exclusivity.97 
 
 88. See C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and 
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 635 (2009) (“[B]uying off 
the first filer is an effective means to remove the most potent entry threat.”).  Not surprisingly, the 
majority of agreements that combine compensation with delayed entry occur between the pioneer 
and first-filer.  See FTC 2010 STUDY, supra note 74, at 5. 
 89. Hemphill, supra note 88, at 645–47. 
 90. Id. at 657. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 649. 
 93. Id. at 649, 657–58. 
 94. Hemphill, supra note 88, at 658 (citing Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 955 F. Supp. 128, 
130 (D.D.C. 1997), aff’d, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the Hatch-Waxman Act 
does not include a “successful defense” requirement, nor does it require that the parties litigate 
the patent claim)). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 658–59. 
 97. Id. at 649. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] DEVISING A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO THE REVERSE PAYMENT DILEMMA 753 
Commentators have identified additional side deals, which entail payments 
by the patent-holder to the generic firm for IP licenses, for supplying raw 
materials, and for helping to promote and develop other products.98  In a more 
sophisticated scenario, Professor Hemphill observes that pioneers disguise 
transfers of value for delayed entry by overpaying the generic firm for an 
unrelated product license.99  For example, the generic firm may transfer for 
consideration an overvalued product license to the pioneer, allowing the 
pioneer to attribute its consideration to the product license rather than to the 
generic firm’s delayed entry.100 
Recently, the FTC has expressed particular concern over agreements in 
which brand-name firms agree not to introduce “authorized generics” during 
the ANDA filer’s 180-day exclusivity period.101  An “authorized generic,” or 
“AG,” is a generic version of a drug marketed by the brand-name firm.102  The 
Hatch-Waxman Act’s 180-day exclusivity provision protects the generic 
entrant from other generic competition, but it does not protect generic firms 
from AG competition.103  Accordingly, since AGs can substantially detract 
from the generic entrant’s duopoly rents during the exclusivity period, an 
agreement by the pioneer to delay introduction of AG competition effectively 
amounts to a payment from the brand-name firm to the generic challenger.104 
As illustrated, reverse payment settlements continue to evolve in ways that 
increasingly obscure whether a payment for delay has been made.  In an effort 
to give antitrust agencies “access to information about secret deals between 
drug companies,” Congress provided in the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act 
(MMA) certain reporting requirements relating to reverse payment 
settlements.105  Section 1112 of the MMA provides that settlement agreements 
between a pioneer and Paragraph IV ANDA challenger must be filed with the 
FTC and Department of Justice, provided that the agreement relates to: 1) the 
manufacture, marketing, or sale of the brand-name drug; 2) the manufacture, 
marketing, or sale of the generic drug; or 3) the 180-day exclusivity period.106  
 
 98. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive 
Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 78 (2009). 
 99. Hemphill, supra note 88, at 663–65. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See FTC 2010 STUDY, supra note 74, at 5. 
 102. Id.  From 2004–2008, approximately 25% of settlement agreements involving first-filer 
generics involved both an agreement by the brand not to launch its AG and an agreement by the 
first-filer to delay market entry.  Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. 
 105. Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical 
Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 187–88 (2008) 
(quoting 148 CONG. REC. S11,340 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)). 
 106. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-173, § 1112, 117 Stat. 2065, 2461–62 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355, invalidated by Florida ex 
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An FTC Staff Study observes that, despite implementation of these statutory 
filing requirements, the MMA did not provide substantive standards relating to 
the legality of reverse payment settlements.107  Unabated, brand-name drug 
manufacturers and generic firms continue to engage in potentially 
anticompetitive reverse payment settlements. 
D. Reverse Payments in the Federal Courts and Congress’ Options for 
Devising a Solution 
The FTC has challenged, and continues to challenge, reverse payment 
settlements in federal courts.  Yet the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits—
relying on the Congressional determination that “[a] patent shall be presumed 
valid”—have generally refused to condemn reverse payment settlements where 
the agreement has not exceeded the scope of the patent.108  Unless the Supreme 
Court provides guidance on directly addressing anticompetitive concerns 
inherent in reverse payment settlements, Congress, with strong support from 
the FTC, will continue to work toward a legislative resolution on the proper 
scope of antitrust liability.109  First, this section will examine the permissive 
approaches adopted by the federal courts determining the proper scope of 
antitrust liability.  Second, it will explain the legislative options available to 
Congress, concluding that the codification of a rule-of-reason analysis is the 
most appropriate legislative solution. 
1. The Federal Courts of Appeals Vary in their Analysis of Antitrust 
Liability 
The Circuit Courts of Appeals have taken somewhat varied approaches to 
determining whether reverse payment settlements run afoul of the Sherman 
Act.  The Eleventh Circuit held that reverse payment settlements should not be 
 
rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91 (RV/EMT), 2011 WL 
285683, (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011)). 
 107. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 10. 
 108. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006); see, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. 
(Cipro IV), 544 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 
1068 (11th Cir. 2005); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1306–09 (11th 
Cir. 2003) (discussing the impact of subsequent invalidity on settlement agreements and holding 
that subsequent invalidity does not affect settlement agreements). 
 109. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 6, at 140 (“The Commission strongly supports a 
legislative remedy for the problem of exclusion payment settlements . . . .”); Pay to Delay: Are 
Patent Settlements that Delay Generic Drug Market Entry Anti-Competitive?: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 10 
(2009) (statement of the FTC) (“[T]he Commission strongly supports H.R. 1706, which would 
prohibit these anticompetitive settlements.”); Leibowitz, supra note 15, at 11 (“Enacting 
legislation is always an uphill battle, but under these circumstances, I like our odds.”). 
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subject to either per se or rule-of-reason condemnation.110  Relying on the 
statutory presumption of patent validity, the Eleventh Circuit has found that a 
determination of “antitrust liability requires an examination of: 1) the scope of 
the exclusionary potential of the patent; 2) the extent to which the agreement 
exceeds that scope; and 3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.”111  The 
Federal and Second Circuits have adopted this approach,112 with the Federal 
Circuit further noting that, absent fraud before the Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) or evidence of sham litigation, it is not necessary that the court 
consider the validity of the underlying patent.113 
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit held that a reverse payment settlement was a 
“classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”114  Yet, as noted by one 
observer, the court did not expressly indicate that the mere existence of a 
reverse payment rendered the settlement per se unlawful.115  Instead, the court 
focused on the fact that the pioneer’s payment to the generic firm kept the 
generic version of the drug off the market, even after it obtained FDA 
approval.116  Moreover, the court expressed much concern with the generic 
firm’s refusal to give up its 180-day exclusivity period, which subsequently 
delayed entry of all third-party generic firms seeking FDA approval.117 
Despite the different result reached in the Sixth Circuit, the decision can be 
reconciled on the unique facts of the case.118  The settlement reviewed by the 
Sixth Circuit, unlike the settlements reviewed in the other courts, restricted the 
generic firm’s ability to market drugs not covered by the patent claims, thereby 
reaching beyond the patent’s “exclusionary zone.”119  Consistent with the 
Solicitor General’s 2006 recommendation, therefore, the Supreme Court 
declined to decide the reverse payment issue because, in fact, no genuine split 
 
 110. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065; Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1311 & n.27. 
 111. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066 (quoting Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1312). 
 112. See, e.g., Cipro IV, 544 F.3d at 1335; In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 
187, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 113. See, e.g., Cipro IV, 544 F.3d at 1336. 
 114. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 115. Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?, 
23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 544 (2007). 
 116. In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 907. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Cipro IV, 544 F.3d at 1335 (“[A]lthough the Sixth Circuit found a per se violation of 
the antitrust laws in In re Cardizem, the facts of that case are distinguishable from this case and 
from the other circuit court decisions.”). 
 119. See id. (finding that the agreement reviewed by the Sixth Circuit “clearly had 
anticompetitive effects outside the exclusion zone of the patent” because it delayed third-party 
generic manufacturers and provided that the ANDA filer would not market non-infringing 
versions of the generic drug at issue). 
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in the circuits existed.120  Because the Supreme Court again denied certiorari in 
2006,121 the FTC asked Congress to help devise a solution to the reverse 
payment dilemma in 2009.122 
2. The Legislative Options Available to Congress 
Devising an approach for determining the scope of antitrust liability is not 
an easy task for Congress.123  On one hand, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a 
statutory framework ripe for anticompetitive settlement arrangements.  As 
Professor Hemphill’s longitudinal study reveals, brand-name firms rarely 
transact with generics outside of the Hatch-Waxman context for the products 
and services that form the basis of side deals, supporting the inference that the 
side deals are merely a device masking payment for delay.124  Yet, as other 
scholars have noted, given the Hatch-Waxman’s peculiar incentives, “[r]everse 
payments may be consistent with a high probability of success on the merits 
for Plaintiff, in which case they are no more offensive to competition policy 
than any other settlement of patent litigation.”125  Thus, many, but not all, 
reverse payment settlements run afoul of the Sherman Act.  With all the 
difficulties inherent in determining the proper scope of antitrust liability, the 
Congressional Research Service concludes that lawmakers are left with three 
possible options: 1) await further judicial developments; 2) pass legislation 
imposing a per se rule of illegality; or 3) pass legislation codifying a rule-of-
reason framework of analysis.126  Congress, led by Senators Chuck Grassley 
and Herb Kohl, has decidedly settled on the third approach. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE GRASSLEY-KOHL BILL 
In February 2009, Senators Grassley and Kohl introduced the Preserve 
Access to Affordable Generics Act, co-sponsored by Senators Russ Feingold, 
Dick Durbin, and Sherrod Brown.127  The bill provided sweeping 
condemnation of reverse payment settlements, effectively codifying a per se 
 
 120. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16–20, FTC v. Schering-Plough 
Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273), 2006 WL 1358441 (arguing that there is no circuit split 
justifying Supreme Court review). 
 121. FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006). 
 122. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 123. See Hemphill, supra note 88, at 632 (highlighting the difficulty in assessing the proper 
scope of antitrust liability for reverse payment settlements). 
 124. Id. at 633; see Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1073 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(citing United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282–83 (6th Cir. 1898) (“Even 
restraints ancillary in form can in substance be illegal if they are part of a general plan to gain 
monopoly control of a market.”). 
 125. Cotter, supra note 80, at 1080. 
 126. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 18–19. 
 127. S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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rule of illegality.128  On October 15, 2009, however, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee voted to pass a compromise version of the bill, which provided for 
a rebuttable presumption of illegality, rather than a per se condemnation of 
reverse payment settlements.129  Pursuant to the proposed legislation, a reverse 
payment settlement between a patent holder and an ANDA filer is deemed 
presumptively unlawful.130  The settling defendants can rebut this presumption 
if they show by clear and convincing evidence that the agreement’s 
procompetitive benefits outweigh its anticompetitive effects.131 
A. The Grassley-Kohl Remedy: A Rebuttable Presumption of Illegality 
The Grassley-Kohl bill provides that any agreement resolving or settling, 
on a final or interim basis, a patent infringement claim “shall be presumed to 
have anticompetitive effects and be unlawful if (i) an ANDA filer receives 
anything of value; and (ii) the ANDA filer agrees to limit or forego research, 
development, manufacturing, marketing, or sales of the ANDA product for any 
period of time.”132  The bill reaches any agreement entered into within thirty 
days of the actual settlement date, and any other agreement that is contingent 
upon or related to the settlement of the patent infringement claim.133  The bill 
does not prohibit settlement agreements pursuant to which the NDA holder 
only pays the ANDA filer reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed 
$7,500,000.134 
In addition, the Grassley-Kohl bill permits defendants to rebut the 
presumption of illegality.135  To do so, the settling defendant must demonstrate 
with “clear and convincing evidence” that the settlement agreement will have 
procompetitive benefits that outweigh its anticompetitive effects.136  In 
determining whether the settling parties have met this burden, the following 
competitive factors shall be considered by the fact finder: 
(1) the length of time remaining until the end of the life of the relevant patent, 
compared with the agreed upon entry date for the ANDA product; 
(2) the value to consumers of the competition from the ANDA product 
allowed under the agreement; 
 
 128. Id. § 29. 
 129. S. REP. NO. 111-123, at 7 (2010).  In late 2009, an identical version of the bill was 
introduced by Senator Herb Kohl as an amendment to the healthcare reform package.  See 155 
CONG. REC. S12,335 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 2009) (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl). 
 130. S. 369, § 28(a)(2)(A). 
 131. Id. § 28(a)(2)(B). 
 132. Id. § 28(a)(2)(A). 
 133. Id. § 28(h)(2). 
 134. Id. § 28(d)(2). 
 135. S. 369, § 28(a)(2)(B). 
 136. Id. 
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(3) the form and amount of consideration received by the ANDA filer in the 
agreement resolving or settling the patent infringement claim; 
(4) the revenue the ANDA filer would have received by winning the patent 
litigation; 
(5) the reduction in the NDA holder’s revenues if it had lost the patent 
litigation; 
(6) the time period between the date of the agreement conveying value to the 
ANDA filer and the date of the settlement of the patent infringement 
claim; and 
(7) any other factor that the fact finder, in its discretion, deems relevant to its 
determination of competitive effects under this subsection.137 
In weighing these competitive factors, the proposed legislation provides that 
the fact finder shall not presume that that generic “entry would not have 
occurred until the expiration of the relevant patent,” or that a provision in the 
agreement providing for generic entry prior to patent expiration means that the 
agreement is procompetitive.138  However, the legislation does provide that 
“such evidence may be relevant to the fact finder’s determination” of the 
procompetitive benefits of the agreement.139 
B. A Rebuttable Presumption of Illegality is an Effective Legislative Solution 
Codifying a presumption of illegality, which the settling defendants can 
rebut under a rule-of-reason framework, is the most appropriate legislative 
solution.  The following analysis first will show that the presumption of 
illegality is consistent with recent scholarship, which demonstrates that reverse 
payment settlements inherently raise competitive concerns.  Given the 
inherently anticompetitive nature of these settlements, as scholars point out, it 
is better that the defendants bear the burden of showing procompetitive 
benefits, as opposed to antitrust authorities and private plaintiffs, who lack 
easy access to such information.  Second, this section will show that, in 
keeping with the public policy favoring settlement of litigation, the rule-of-
reason framework embodied in the proposed legislation avoids false 
condemnation of pro-competitive agreements.  Finally, this section will show 
that the bill is consistent with modern antitrust jurisprudence, which largely 
has abrogated the rigid per se rule in favor of a more precise focus on the 
anticompetitive effects of business practices challenged as violations of the 
antitrust laws. 
In California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission, the 
Supreme Court discussed the intermediate “quick look” analysis of competitive 
 
 137. Id. § 28(b). 
 138. Id. § 28(c)(1). 
 139. Id. § 28(c)(2). 
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restraints.140  The quick-look rests on the notion that certain business practices 
are so inherently anticompetitive that the Court, without an “elaborate industry 
analysis,” is justified in shifting the burden to the defendants to show 
procompetitive effects.141  Not only are reverse payment settlements inherently 
anticompetitive, as scholars observe, the complexity of reverse payment 
settlements has made it increasingly difficult for courts and the FTC to 
determine the reasonableness of reverse payments without launching a 
complex inquiry into the terms of the agreement and the business judgment of 
the settling parties.142  A reverse payment, for example, may be the sum of 
numerous side deals, including co-promotion agreements, IP licenses, supply 
agreements, no-authorized-generic provisions, and other development terms.143  
In this scenario, the settling parties should presumably have the records 
showing the multifarious settlement terms, particularly in light of the MMA 
reporting requirements.144  It follows that any legislation should presume the 
illegality of the reverse payment settlement and then place the burden of 
bringing forth evidence of the payment’s reasonableness on the settling 
defendants, who have the most immediate access to such information.145  The 
Grassley-Kohl bill appropriately adopts this approach. 
Additionally, the Grassley-Kohl bill balances the public policy favoring 
settlement of litigation against the inherently anticompetitive nature of reverse 
payments.  A legislative solution should recognize that settlement of patent 
infringement litigation is a voluntary, efficiency-enhancing arrangement that 
 
 140. 526 U.S. 756, 769–71 (1999) (ultimately holding that the lower court incorrectly applied 
the quick-look analysis to the case at hand). 
 141. Id. at 763 (quoting the lower court decision, 128 F.3d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1997)) (citations 
omitted). 
 142. See Carrier, supra note 98, at 79 (noting that the increasingly nuanced form of 
settlements is making it harder for the FTC and antitrust plaintiffs to “track down evidence of 
payments for delay”); Hearing on H.R. 1706, Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act 
of 2009, Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce and Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, 
and Consumer Prot., 111th Cong. 9 (2009) (statement of C. Scott Hemphill).  Hemphill adds that 
side deals involving a non-financial exchange of consideration may be facially absurd because it 
is clear that the brand-name firm does not need, for example, new drug development unrelated to 
its core business.  Id. at 10.  In other situations, however, the brand-name firm may be attempting 
to expand its core business, and the generic may have expertise in the matter relating to the side 
deal.  Id. 
 143. In Schering-Plough v. FTC, for example, payment by the brand-name firm to the generic 
challenger comprised a three-part licensing deal, which called for Schering to pay $60 million in 
initial royalty fees, $10 million in milestone royalty payments, and 10% to 15% royalties on sales.  
402 F.3d 1056, 1060 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 144. Erica N. Andersen, Note, Schering the Market: Analyzing the Debate Over Reverse-
Payment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 and In Re 
Tamoxifen Citrate Litigation, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1061–62 (2008). 
 145. Carrier, supra note 98, at 79. 
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the law generally encourages.146  Yet, as recently argued by the Department of 
Justice, a workable rule cannot encourage settlements to the extent that the 
patent-holder can evade entirely the risk of patent invalidation.147  Along those 
lines, the Grassley-Kohl bill’s rebuttable presumption of illegality prevents the 
patent-holder from “contract[ing] [its] way out of the statutorily imposed risk 
that patent litigation could lead to invalidation of the patent while claiming 
antitrust immunity for that private contract.”148  At the same time, it properly 
allows the settling defendants to rebut the presumption by setting forth 
evidence of the agreement’s procompetitive benefits, if any exist.149  Thus, the 
proposed legislation reconciles the conflicting interests in generic drug 
competition and settlement of litigation. 
Finally, the proposed legislation’s rule-of-reason framework is consistent 
with modern antitrust jurisprudence.  Early cases arising under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act relied on a rigid dichotomy of competitive effects analysis, 
subjecting restraints of trade either to rule-of-reason or per se treatment.150  
Beginning in the late-1970s, however, the Supreme Court set out to place 
significant limits on the application of the per se rule151 and move “from a 
dichotomous categorical approach to a more nuanced and case-specific 
inquiry.”152  Accordingly, it began to “reframe antitrust rules around core 
economic concepts of anticompetitive effect, market power, and efficiencies,” 
thereby eroding the long-standing analytical dichotomy.153  As a result, there 
has been a movement away from irrebuttable presumptions of 
 
 146. See Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]here is a 
compelling public interest and policy in upholding and enforcing settlement agreements 
voluntarily entered into because enforcement of settlement agreements encourages parties to enter 
into them—thus fostering judicial economy.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 147. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 148. DOJ Brief, supra note 14, at 14. 
 149. See supra Part II.A. 
 150. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 27, at 158–59; see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 
310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940) (“Whatever may be its peculiar problems and characteristics, the 
Sherman Act, so far as price-fixing agreements are concerned, establishes one uniform rule 
applicable to all industries alike.”). 
 151. See Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977) (rejecting the 
application of the per se rule as it applied to non-price vertical restraints); Broad. Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979) (de-classifying a blanket licensing 
arrangement as per se illegal “price-fixing” based on consideration of the arrangement’s ability to 
generate economic efficiencies, such as increased output and lower costs); NCAA v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99, 100 (1984) (refusing to apply a per se rule to an 
agreement by the NCAA limiting the number of intercollegiate football games that could be 
televised). 
 152. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 33–34 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 153. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 27, at 165. 
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unreasonableness to a more focused analysis of anticompetitive effects.154  In 
light of these developments, codifying a per se rule banning reverse payment 
settlements would constitute a significant departure from modern antitrust 
policy.  The Grassley-Kohl bill appropriately focuses on the anticompetitive 
effects, rather than pigeon-holing reverse payment settlements into the per se 
category of competitive restraints. 
III.  FILLING IN THE GAPS OF THE GRASSLEY-KOHL BILL 
The proposed legislation leaves important questions unanswered.  For one, 
it does not identify how the settling defendants can show that a reverse 
payment in excess of avoided litigation costs is procompetitive, leaving wide 
open the field of possible “competitive factors” to be considered by the fact 
finder.  Moreover, its focus on the direction and timing of payment leaves open 
the possibility that creative lawyers can structure agreements that pass muster 
under the legislation. 
The following analysis of the Grassley-Kohl bill proceeds by showing that 
a reverse payment settlement providing for generic entry prior to patent 
expiration should carry significant evidentiary weight.  Then, it shows why the 
fact finder should consider the indirect costs of protracted litigation, as well as 
settings in which a reverse payment, although in excess of avoided litigation 
costs, may be otherwise reasonable.  Next, it argues in favor of a limited 
inquiry into the merits of the patent claim as qualifying as a “competitive 
factor.”  This section concludes by demonstrating why the bill’s narrow focus 
on the direction and timing of payment leaves much room for crafty lawyers to 
structure lawful agreements that have the same anticompetitive effects of a 
reverse payment settlement involving a basic cash payment, and proposes 
possible solutions. 
A. A Settlement Providing for Generic Entry Prior to Patent Expiration 
Should Carry Significant Evidentiary Weight 
The Grassley-Kohl bill provides that the fact finder “shall consider . . . the 
value to consumers of [generic] competition . . . allowed under the 
agreement.”155  At the same time, however, it provides that the fact finder 
“shall not presume” that a generic entry date set before patent expiration (i.e., 
the value of competition to consumers) means that the agreement is 
procompetitive, although it “may be relevant” to the fact finder’s ultimate 
competitive effects determination.156  Despite these seemingly contradictory 
 
 154. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (holding 
that, regardless of whether the per se rule or rule-of-reason analysis is applied, “the purpose of the 
analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint”). 
 155. S. 369, 111th Cong. § 28(b)(2) (2009). 
 156. Id. § 28(c)(2). 
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provisions, an agreement providing for generic entry prior to patent expiration 
should be highly “relevant” to the competitive effects analysis. 
The aforementioned provisions in the Grassley-Kohl bill follow from the 
economic analysis of antitrust economist Carl Shapiro.  According to Professor 
Shapiro, “consumers have a ‘property right’ to the level of competition that 
would have prevailed, on average, had the two parties litigated the patent 
dispute to a resolution in the courts.”157  Accordingly, a settlement providing 
for generic entry prior to patent expiration is anticompetitive when an earlier 
entry date was likely to prevail, had it not been for the reverse payment 
settlement.158  Consistent with Professor Shapiro’s position, under the 
Grassley-Kohl bill, the fact finder cannot presume that an entry date set prior 
to patent expiration automatically means that the settlement is 
procompetitive.159 
Professor Shapiro’s position should not detract from the relevancy of a 
settlement provision providing for generic entry prior to patent expiration.  For 
one, the Second Circuit rejected his position, finding “no legal basis for 
restricting the rights of patentees to choose their enforcement vehicle.”160  
Moreover, the court concluded that the “concept of a public property right in 
the outcome of private lawsuits does not translate well into the realities of 
litigation.”161  For the litigants, having to answer to third parties claiming a 
property right in the outcome of litigation would reduce settlement options, 
thereby increasing the costs of litigation.162  Not only could this have the 
unintended effect of discouraging patent challenges by ANDA filers, 
restricting the litigants’ settlement options would, in effect, increase the cost of 
 
 157. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 395–96 
(2003).  Professor Shapiro proposes that, as a rule, a reverse payment settlement “cannot lead to 
lower expected consumer surplus than would have arisen from ongoing litigation.”  Id. at 410. 
 158. Contra In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro III), 363 F. Supp. 2d 
514, 536 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting, but rejecting, Plaintiff’s arguments that a payment to secure a 
later entry date is anticompetitive).  Similarly, in Schering-Plough, the Commissioner’s basis for 
imposing antitrust liability for a reverse payment settlement was that in the absence of payments 
by the pioneer, the parties would have devised alternative settlement arrangements with earlier 
generic entry dates, a position that the Court rejected.  Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 
1056, 1071–72 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 159. S. 369, § 28 (c)(2). 
 160. Cipro III, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 531. 
 161. Id.  See Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment 
Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1040 (2004) (noting that consumers have no expectation to 
savings procured by infringement and that the gains made by protecting innovation may 
compensate for the loss in savings). 
 162. Schildkraut, supra note 161, at 1049. 
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patent enforcement, thereby reducing the economic value of patents.163  This, 
in turn, could effectively reduce the incentives for innovation.164 
Ultimately, a settlement that provides for generic entry prior to patent 
expiration should weigh strongly in favor of a procompetitive arrangement, 
even in the presence of a large reverse payment.  As articulated by the 
Supreme Court, the Sherman Act does not give antitrust authorities “carte 
blanche to insist that a monopolist alter its way of doing business whenever 
some other approach might yield greater competition.”165  Likewise, the 
Grassley-Kohl bill should not be applied in a manner that insists litigants 
construct settlements that yield consumer surplus to an extent that might have 
prevailed had litigation continued. 
B. The Fact finder Should Consider the Indirect Costs of Protracted Patent 
Litigation in Ascertaining the Settlement’s Procompetitive Benefits 
Legal scholars have noted that “[w]e should be loathe [sic] to adopt any 
principles that discourage the settlement of good faith litigation,” given that 
settlements are voluntary, efficiency-enhancing arrangements that public 
policy generally encourages.166  Settlements preserve judicial resources, avoid 
unnecessary litigation costs, and increase social welfare “by facilitating the 
creation of wealth through consensual transactions.”167  Per se condemnation 
of patent settlement litigation would require firms to engage in expensive and 
inefficient litigation—the direct costs of which would be passed on to 
consumers—to resolve a patent dispute, even though they might prefer to 
 
 163. See Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003) 
(“A ban on reverse-payment settlements would reduce the incentive to challenge patents by 
reducing the challenger’s settlement options should he be sued for infringement, and so might 
well be thought anticompetitive.”). 
 164. See JONATHAN ORSZAG & ROBERT WILLIG, A PRELIMINARY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
FTC CHAIRMAN LEIBOWITZ’S JUNE 23RD SPEECH 4 (June 24, 2009) (“The prospect of facing 
patent challenges and more frequent protracted litigation to defend patents may also discourage 
investments in innovation to develop new drugs in the first place.”), available at 
http://www.compasslexecon.com/highlights/Documents/Orszag-Willig%20Statement%20Re% 
20FTC%20Reverse%20Payment%20Settlement%20Study.pdf. 
 165. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415–16 
(2004). 
 166.  Harry M. Reasoner & Scott J. Atlas, The Settlement of Litigation as a Ground for 
Antitrust Liability, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 115, 123 (1981–1982); see also Daniel A. Crane, Exit 
Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic 
Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 749 (2002). 
 167. Crane, supra note 166, at 749.  See also Schlegal Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775, 
783 (1975) (“The importance of encouraging settlement of patent-infringement litigation . . . 
cannot be overstated.”); Schildkraut, supra note 161, at 1042 (stating that settlements conserve 
public and private resources, “remove uncertainty and eliminate risk, lower capital costs and 
increase investment in the economy”). 
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settle.168  To alleviate these concerns, under the Grassley-Kohl bill a settlement 
involving a reverse payment not in excess of $7,500,000 is not deemed 
presumptively unlawful.169 
Although the bill accounts for the direct costs of litigation, it does not 
expressly encompass the less quantifiable, indirect costs that mandated 
litigation imposes on drug manufacturers and consumers.  Professors Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and Mark Lemley argue that reverse payments 
should be “limited to a good faith estimate of the out-of-pocket costs and 
attorney’s fees the patentee could expect to pay between the time of the 
settlement and the time the case was concluded.”170  Yet, this view of litigation 
costs, accordingly to Professor Crane, overlooks “the many costs of litigation 
that firm managers consider in deciding whether to settle.”171 
For one, Professor Crane correctly points out that firms incur the 
opportunity cost of redirecting their efforts to litigation, rather than the 
ordinary course of the business.172  Moreover, indirect social costs are imposed 
on the litigating parties and consumers as competitors can gain access to 
opposing firm’s trade secrets during discovery, including, for example, pricing 
lists, marketing studies, and customer lists.173  Access to such information may 
allow the generic to free-ride off of the patent-holder’s internal research and 
development activities, the effect of which may, over time, destroy incentives 
to develop efficient means of production and distribution.174  Additionally, 
calculating damages in a patent dispute often requires inter-party access to 
pricing, cost, and production information.175  Subsequently, the mandatory 
sharing of such information can facilitate price-fixing and conscious 
parallelism, the very conduct antitrust rules are designed to prevent.176  Finally, 
eliminating a generic challenger’s settlement options, should he be sued for 
infringement, may reduce the incentive to challenge brand-name patents in the 
first place, particularly for small pharmaceutical companies unable to 
 
 168. Crane, supra note 167, at 749; see In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. 
(Cipro III), 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 532 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Requiring parties to a lawsuit either to 
litigate or negotiate a settlement in the public interest . . . is, as a practical matter, tantamount to 
establishing a rule requiring litigants to continue to litigate when they would prefer to settle 
. . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 169. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009). 
 170. Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 
87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1760 n.177 (2003). 
 171. Daniel A. Crane, Response, Ease Over Accuracy in Assessing Patent Settlements, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 698, 703 (2004). 
 172. Id. at 703–04. 
 173. Crane, supra note 166, at 757–58. 
 174. Id. at 758. 
 175. Id. at 759. 
 176. Id. at 758. 
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withstand lengthy patent litigation.177  Consequently, mandating litigation may 
indirectly result in less, not more, generic competition. 
As illustrated, firms deciding to settle litigation take into account many 
costs that are not easily quantified.  Under the proposed legislation, therefore, 
the fact finder should consider the indirect costs of mandating protracted 
litigation when conducting the competitive effects analysis. 
C. The Fact Finder Should Consider Settings in Which Reverse Payments In 
Excess of Avoided Litigation Costs are Otherwise Reasonable 
As noted earlier, the scope of antitrust liability for reverse payment 
settlements generally is based on the notion that, where a brand-name firm—
faced with the risk of patent invalidation and an enormous decline in profits—
makes a payment greatly in excess of avoided litigation costs, it is necessarily 
intending to exclude more competition than the patent could otherwise 
provide.178  Consistent with this view, the Grassley-Kohl bill requires that the 
fact finder consider the possible loss in profits that the brand-name firm risked 
at trial, along with the amount of avoided litigation expenses.  The bill, 
however, does not indicate the extent to which a reverse payment in excess of 
avoided litigation costs should be deemed anticompetitive. 
The following analysis shows that the Grassley-Kohl bill should permit the 
fact finder to consider evidence of particular settings in which the reverse 
payment, although greatly in excess of avoided litigation costs, may be 
otherwise reasonable.  Economists Robert Willig and John Bigelow 
demonstrate that the amount of consideration received by the ANDA filer does 
not reliably explain the anticompetitive nature of a settlement agreement.179  
Additional obstacles—differences in market information, disparate 
expectations of patent validity, and financially strapped litigants—often stand 
in the way of reaching a mutually beneficial agreement terminating 
 
 177. See ORSZAG & WILLIG, supra note 164, at 2 (“[O]verly simple economic models ignore 
important economic realities that can make reverse payment settlements procompetitive.”); 
Kristina Nordlander & Patrick Harrison, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements—A Presumption in 
Reverse, GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY, Aug. 2009, at 2, 5 (“The assessment of the financial and 
corporate policy-related advantages and disadvantages of a proposed settlement can be an 
extremely complex process for the parties themselves, let alone for a competition authority.  As 
such, there are many pro-competitive and legitimate reasons why a payment or value transfer ‘in 
reverse’ might be made in the context of a settlement agreement . . . .”). 
 178. DOJ Brief, supra note 14, at 25. 
 179. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he size of 
the payment, or the mere presence of a payment, should not dictate the availability of a settlement 
remedy.”); Shapiro, supra note 157, at 407–08 (stating that naked cash payments from the patent 
holder to generic challenger are not necessarily anticompetitive when other factors, including 
asymmetric information, are brought into the analysis). 
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litigation.180  In these settings, reaching settlement without a reverse payment 
may be impossible, even though the settlement would avoid unnecessary 
litigation costs and provide for generic entry prior to patent expiration.181  
Under the proposed legislation, therefore, the fact finder should consider 
evidence that the reverse payment, although in excess of avoided litigation 
costs, was otherwise reasonable, in light of prevailing obstacles to reaching 
settlement. 
1. Asymmetrical Information Regarding the Patent’s Economic Value 
Condemning an agreement based on the amount of payment, without 
factoring into the analysis asymmetrical information held by either party, may 
condemn settlements involving an otherwise reasonable payment.182  Willig 
and Bigelow show that a reverse payment may be required where the patent-
holder has superior information about the economic value of the patent.183 
Oftentimes a brand-name firm will have superior information about the 
economic value of the patent, and the generic firm, although it does not possess 
such information, knows that the brand does.  Consequently, the “known 
disparity of information influences the bargaining between them.”184  Willig 
and Bigelow point out that, if the brand-name firm knows that its patent has 
little economic value, it will offer the generic firm a relatively early date of 
entry, and from that offer the generic will infer that the brand-name patent is 
relatively weak.185  Thus, the parties likely can reach an agreement without a 
 
 180. See Robert D. Willig & John P. Bigelow, Antitrust Policy Toward Agreements that Settle 
Patent Litigation, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 655, 667 (2004) (discussing the likelihood that the 
pioneer has more information about the product’s position in the market).  See Opening Brief of 
Schering-Plough Corp. at 23, Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(No. 04-10688), 2004 WL 3557974  (summarizing the testimony of mediating experts that “many 
disputes cannot be settled within the four corners of the dispute itself.  Parties disagree about the 
strength of their cases and frequently reach an impasse”). 
 181. In Schering Plough, the FTC’s economics expert conceded that “I don’t know . . . 
whether the parties could have settled the lawsuit without a payment.”  Opening Brief of 
Schering-Plough Corp., supra note 180, at 45 (citing Complaint Counsel’s economics expert). 
 182. John P. Bigelow & Robert D. Willig, “Reverse Payments” in Settlements of Patent 
Litigation: Schering-Plough, K-Dur, and the FTC (2005), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: 
ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 248, 257–58 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White 
eds., 5th ed. 2009). 
 183. Id.  See also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro III), 363 F. Supp. 
2d 514, 536 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[D]ue to the disparity between the brand-name manufacturer’s 
and generic challenger’s expected profits, there might not be any date that represents a reasonable 
litigation compromise for early (pre-patent expiration) entry by the generic challenger.”). 
 184. Willig & Bigelow, supra note 180, at 660. 
 185. Id. 
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reverse payment because the brand’s actual knowledge of the patent’s 
economic value matches up with the generic’s inference of that value.186 
On the other hand, if the patent-holder knows, and the generic is unaware, 
that no viable substitutes for the patented drug will become available in the 
near-term, the parties are unlikely to reach a settlement based solely on an 
agreed-upon entry date.187  Since the value of the patent is high, given that no 
viable substitutes for the drug are available, the patent holder is unwilling to 
give up its monopoly and the generic is only willing to accept an entry date 
substantially earlier than expected through litigation.188  Thus, a reverse 
payment, by signaling to the generic that the patent is strong, bridges the 
informational gap between the parties and leads to settlement of the 
litigation.189  If the agreed-upon entry date is before the expected date of entry 
under litigation, then the reverse payment settlement is likely a procompetitive 
arrangement.190 
2. Varied Assessments of Success on the Merits 
Where the parties have different expectations about the probability of 
success in litigation, according to Willig and Bigelow, a cash payment from 
the patent holder to the generic may facilitate a settlement.191  In a likely 
scenario, the generic entrant is overly optimistic about its chances of winning 
the patent litigation.192  The gap between the generic’s predictions of success 
on the merits varies substantially from the patent holder’s expectations, with 
the result that the parties are unable to agree on an acceptable date of entry.193 
If the gap in expectations is sufficiently wide, even the possibility of saved 
litigation expenses will not result in a mutually agreed-upon settlement.194  
However, a sufficiently large payment bridges the expectation gap and allows 
the parties to reach an agreement on the generic entry date.195  If the agreed-
 
 186. Id. at 660–61. 
 187. Bigelow & Willig, supra note 182, at 258. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Willig & Bigelow, supra note 180, at 672. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Willig & Bigelow provide the following economic analysis to explain this result: 
To the [pioneer], moving the date of entry by one day later increases profit by the 
difference between one day’s worth of monopoly and one day’s worth of duopoly.  To the 
[generic], though, moving the date of entry by one day later diminishes profit only by one 
day’s worth of duopoly.  Since monopoly profit exceeds the sum of the profits of the two 
duopolists . . . the difference between one day’s worth of monopoly and one day’s worth 
of duopoly is greater than one day’s worth of duopoly.  Consequently, each dollar the 
[pioneer] is willing to pay the [generic] extends the last entry date the [generic] is willing 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
768 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:741 
upon entry date occurs before the date that would have prevailed through 
litigation, then the settlement can benefit both the settling parties and 
consumers. 
3. Cash-Strapped Generics 
Bigelow and Willig additionally show that a reverse payment may become 
necessary for the brand-name firm and generic challenger to reach a settlement 
when the generic challenger is in substantial need of cash.196  Under such 
circumstances, the generic challenger, who needs financing and cannot 
otherwise obtain it from capital markets, may only agree to an entry date 
sufficient to secure an early stream of revenue from the marketing of the 
generic product.197  The brand-name firm, however, may view its chances of 
success in litigation very positively, thus rejecting the generic’s proposal for an 
early date of entry.198  Unable to agree on an entry date without a reverse 
payment, the parties would undoubtedly proceed through costly litigation.199  
With a reverse payment that satisfies the entrant’s need for cash and that 
accompanies an agreed-upon entry date, the parties may reach a mutually 
beneficial settlement.200  If, pursuant to the agreement, the entry date is set 
before the entry date that would prevail under litigation, the settlement benefits 
consumers as well.201 
In sum, the process by which parties reach a settlement agreement is 
extremely complex, particularly in the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  
Under the proposed legislation, therefore, the fact finder should not rely solely 
on the amount of payment and profits the litigants stood to gain or lose if 
litigation were to continue.  Instead, the fact finder should carefully examine 
the settling parties’ other motivations for entering into the reverse payment 
settlement, including informational asymmetries, disparate expectations of 
success at trial, and cash-strapped parties. 
 
to accept by more days than the extension of the earliest date the [pioneer] is willing to 
accept.  Thus, a large enough payment may enable the parties to reach an agreement . . . . 
Id. at 672–73. 
 196. Bigelow & Willig, supra note 182, at 257. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Bigelow & Willig, supra note 182, at 257. 
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D. The Fact Finder Should Consider Whether the Reverse Payment Was 
Consistent with the Litigants’ Assessments of the Merits of the Patent 
Claim 
A rule-of-reason analysis centers on whether, under all the circumstances, 
the pioneer’s payment to the generic firm purchased more reduced competition 
than the underlying patent could otherwise provide.202  Since the Grassley-
Kohl bill provides that the settling defendants cannot carry this burden merely 
by showing that the agreement provided an entry date before patent expiration, 
the settling defendants must have other options available at their disposal.  
Consistent with the DOJ’s recent proposal, the settling defendants should be 
able to show that the size of the payment reflected their contemporaneous 
evaluations of the strength of the patent claim.203 
Applying the DOJ’s proposal to the Grassley-Kohl bill would require a 
limited inquiry into the parties’ subjective evaluations of the likelihood that the 
patent would be declared invalid.  In In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride 
Antitrust Litigation, however, the court declared that “it is inappropriate for an 
antitrust court . . . to conduct an after-the-fact inquiry into the validity of the 
underlying patent.”204  Similarly, the United State Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, citing the statutory presumption of patent validity, disagreed 
with the Solicitor General that an analysis of antitrust liability requires a 
limited inquiry into the merits of the patent claim.205  Despite the courts’ 
declarations, the proposed legislation permits the defendant to rebut the 
presumption that a reverse payment settlement agreement is illegal by 
demonstrating, under a rule-of-reason analysis, that the settlement agreement 
will have procompetitive benefits that outweigh its anticompetitive effects.206 
 To carry this burden, the brand-name drug manufacturer must be permitted to 
show that it was not purchasing more market exclusion than the patent could 
otherwise afford.  Inevitably, this requires that the defendant come forward 
with evidence of its evaluation of the probable outcome of litigation. 
As a final matter, determining the state of affairs in a “but-for” world can 
be difficult; precision may be impossible.  Thus, consistent with the DOJ’s 
proposal, under the Grassley-Kohl bill, precision should not be required.  
Instead, the litigants should be permitted to provide a less burdensome 
 
 202. See DOJ Brief, supra note 14, at 25 (“Liability properly turns on whether, in avoiding 
the prospect of invalidation that accompanies infringement litigation, the parties have by contract 
obtained more exclusion than warranted in light of that prospect.”). 
 203. Id. at 28. 
 204. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro III), 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 530 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 205. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro IV), 544 F.3d 1323, 1337 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
 206. S. 369, 111th Cong. § 28(a)(2)(B) (2009). 
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“reasonable explanation” that the reverse payment was consistent with their 
subjective evaluations of the strength of the patent claims.207  Although settling 
defendants have countered that assessing the relative strength of the patent is 
an amorphous concept, subject to speculation and doubt,208 as noted by one 
scholar, “the challenger and the patentee will have probably thought long and 
hard, and sought expert advice, about the strength of the IP case prior to 
settlement, so there should normally be relevant information and documents to 
guide the tribunal.”209 
Assessing the parties’ relative assessments of the strength of the 
underlying patent claim poses procedural difficulties; settlement negotiations 
are protected by rules of confidentiality and are further subject to the attorney-
client privilege.  McMillan, Bram, and Tappan have proposed a rather 
ingenious three-part solution to this problem.210  First, the plaintiffs can gather 
all publicly available information relating to the settlement and the underlying 
patent, including information published by the FDA, papers filed with the 
USPTO, annual reports filed with the SEC, and court documents filed with the 
FTC and DOJ.211  Second, to obtain additional, confidential information 
relating to settlement discussions, the antitrust plaintiffs can invoke Federal 
Rule of Evidence 408, which allows for the admissibility of evidence that is 
not offered to prove “‘liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim’ that was 
the subject of the negotiations.”212  Finally, and only if necessary, the plaintiffs 
can attempt to invoke the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege 
by making a prima facie showing of the defendants’ intent to violate the 
 
 207. See DOJ Brief, supra note 14, at 32. 
 208. The generic defendants in Cipro III expressed much concern with the Court’s questions 
pertaining to the defendant’s assessment of the patent’s strength.  See Generic Defendants’ 
Responses to the Court’s February 22, 2005 Questions Relating to Summary Judgment at 5, In re 
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro III), 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(No. 1:00MDL1383DGT), 2005 WL 975866 (“Are we only considering some sort of 
‘metaphysical’ strength of the patent under the patent laws, or are we also to factor in ‘false 
positives’ in the risk assessment—as this Court asks in another question, things like bias or 
incompetence or lack of patent law experience?”). 
 209. Ronald W. Davis, Reverse Payment Patent Settlements: A View into the Abyss, and a 
Modest Proposal, ANTITRUST, Fall 2006, at 26, 32 (2006). 
 210. Richard McMillan, Jr. et al., Essay, Solving the Procedural Quagmire for Testing 
Reverse Payment Settlements, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 801, 827 (2010). 
 211. Id. at 819–20. 
 212. Id. at 821 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 408).  The problem with using Rule 408 to obtain 
confidential documents and correspondence relating to settlement negotiations is that it may chill 
settlement negotiations and thereby undermine the policies behind the Rule.  Id. at 822.  The 
authors argue that “[o]nly companies that intend to effect an anti-competitive agreement would 
need to worry about such ‘chilling effects.’”  Id.  This argument, however, is convincing only if 
we assume the parties are confident in the patent’s relative weakness.  Parties unsure about the 
patent’s strength may avoid entering settlement negotiations altogether. 
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antitrust laws.213  Although the merits of this proposal are beyond the present 
analysis, it does provide a foundation on which scholars can develop a 
framework for overcoming the aforementioned procedural difficulties and 
clearly warrants further scholarly debate. 
In sum, although the Hatch-Waxman Act created incentives for a brand-
name firm to assert, and then settle, weak patent claims, the proposed 
legislation should not assume that in every case the brand-name firm is 
asserting a similarly weak patent claim.  Instead, where the amount of payment 
substantially exceeds the settling parties’ avoided litigation costs, the proposed 
legislation should permit the settling defendants to demonstrate that the 
payment is consistent with a high probability that the patent is valid and 
infringed. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice O’Connor stated that “[i]n the area of antitrust law, there is a 
competing interest, well represented in this Court’s decisions, in recognizing 
and adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated 
experience.”214  The Grassley-Kohl bill, with its open-ended list of 
“competitive factors,” allows courts to evaluate with flexibility the competitive 
effects of reverse payment settlements, under all the circumstances, bearing in 
mind the competing interests in competition, innovation, and the public policy 
favoring the settlement of disputes without litigation.  Ultimately, if the 
Grassley-Kohl bill, or similar legislation, is enacted, challenges in 
interpretation and application will remain, namely, devising the least costly 
process by which the settling defendants can establish their evaluation of 
patent strength without conducting a full-blown inquiry into patent validity.  
Nonetheless, the Grassley-Kohl bill is an effective legislative response to the 
reverse payment dilemma. 
TIMOTHY A. WEIL 
  
 
 213. Id. at 823.  The authors admit that the crime-fraud exception is “reserved for exceptional 
circumstances.”  Id. at 826.  Moreover, they noted that the analysis should never reach this step 
“unless and until the antitrust plaintiff ha[s] demonstrated a real basis for its claim,” set forth 
evidence of an intent to violate the antitrust laws, and exhausted other less intrusive discovery 
tools.  Id. at 824. 
 214. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 6, 20 (1997). 
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